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A new public key cryptosystem was introduced by Wu and Dawson at the Fourth
International Conference on Finite Fields (Fq4). This scheme is similar to the
McEliece public key cryptosystem, in the sense that it also can be described in terms of
linear error-correcting codes over "nite "elds. However, in contrast to the McEliece
scheme, the security of the Wu}Dawson system is not based on a decoding problem
which is assumed to be intractable but on the theory of generalized inverses of
matrices over "nite "elds. The authors compare their scheme with the McEliece
scheme and claim that the same level of security can be obtained using smaller codes,
therefore reducing the key size. In this note it will be shown that the Wu}Dawson
scheme is insecure, i.e., a trapdoor can be computed e$ciently from the knowledge of
the public key. ( 1999 Academic Press
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analysis.1. INTRODUCTION
The use of linear error-correcting codes over "nite "elds in cryptography
dates back to 1978, when McEliece introduced a public key cryptosystem
using Goppa codes [3]. The security of this scheme is based on the decoding
problem for arbitrary linear error-correcting codes, which was shown to be
NP-hard in [1]. Although the McEliece system attracted a lot of attention
since its introduction, it is still unbroken. Two practical disadvantages of the
scheme are message expansion and the large size of the keys used. The latter is
the major drawback of the scheme. For a detailed discussion of the McEliece
scheme (and related schemes), the reader is referred to [4].
Recently, a new public key cryptosystem was introduced by Wu and
Dawson [5]. Their scheme, which will be described in Section 2, uses the386
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CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE WU}DAWSON PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM 387notion of generalized inverses of matrices over "nite "elds. The system is
presented using error-correcting codes, although the error-correcting capa-
bility of the code is not used. However, this notation is convenient in the sense
that it leads to a natural comparison with the McEliece scheme. They give
a risk analysis of their scheme and conclude that the same level of security as
in the McEliece system can be achieved by using smaller error-correcting
codes, therefore reducing the size of the keys. In Section 3 a set of trapdoors
for the encryption function will be described. The elements of this set can
be computed e$ciently from the public key. A procedure for computing
one particular element of this set is given, implying that the scheme is
insecure.
2. THE WU}DAWSON SCHEME
First some de"nitions and notations are given which are needed in the
description of the Wu}Dawson scheme. If A3Fm]n
q
then the set of general-
ized inverses of A is de"ned as
G
A
:"MAg3Fn]m
q
D AAgA"AN
and the set of generalized re-inverses of A as
R
A
:"MA~3Fn]m
q
DA~AA~"A~N.
The transposed matrix of A is denoted by AT and the rank of A by rank(A). If
rank(A)"r (4minMm, nN) then (see [5, Lemma 3])
DG
A
D"qmn~r2. (2.1)
A linear error-correcting code of (block) length n over F
q
is a linear subspace
of Fn
q
. If the dimension of this subspace is k then C is called an [n, k] code.
Such a code can be represented by a generator matrix G3Fk]n
q
for which the
rows form a basis for C, i.e. C"MmG Dm3Fk
q
N. Another way of representing
the code is by a parity check matrix H3F (n!k)]n
q
of rank n!k such that
GHT"0, i.e., C"Mx3Fn
q
D xHT"0N. For more detailed information about
the theory of error-correcting codes, the reader is referred to [2].
„he =u}Dawson Public Key Cryptosystem
Let C be an [n, k] code. Let G3Fk]n
q
be a generator matrix and let
H3F(n~k)]n
q
be a parity check matrix of the code C. Let H~3Fn](n~k)
q
be an
element of R
H
.
388 PETER ROELSEPublic key: G, H~.
Encryption: The plain text m3Fk
q
is encrypted into c3Fn
q
by selecting a
random vector e3Fn~k
q
and computing c :"mG#e(H~)T.
Secret key: H~H.
Decryption: 1. Compute c!c (H~H)T, which equals mG.
2. Select k linearly independent columns of G and solve the
corresponding system of linear equations to retrieve m from mG.
In their risk analysis the authors show that it is impractical to "nd H by
searching through all generalized inverses of H~ (with r :"rank(H~)), since
Eq. (2.1) yields
DG
H~
D"qn(n~k)/qr2 .
A similar argument holds for searching all possible parity check matrices for
C (which can be computed using the publicly known generator matrix G)
since the number of parity check matrices equals
n~k~1
<
i/0
(qn~k!qi ).
Recall that the encryption function in the McEliece public key crypto-
system is given by c"mG#e, where G3Fk]n
q
is the public key and e3Fn
q
is
a random vector of Hamming weight t. The secret key consists of a non-
singular matrix S3Fk]k
q
and a permutation matrix P3Fn]n
q
such that
G"SGI P with GI 3Fk]n
q
a generator matrix for a Goppa code (for which
e$cient decoding algorithms exist). The value of t is small in comparison with
n because it has to be correctable by such a decoding algorithm. McEliece
suggested using a [1024, 524] Goppa code which is capable of correcting 50
("t) errors.
The best known attack on the McEliece scheme (when no extra assump-
tions are made such as that the same message is sent more than once) is based
on a decoding algorithm for general linear codes. This attack consists of
selecting k linearly independent columns of G. If the corresponding k posi-
tions of the cipher text are error free, the message can be revealed. A version
of this attack, which is somewhat more e$cient in practice, uses a parity
check matrix of the code and tries to trap all errors in n!k positions
(see [4]).
This attack can be applied directly to the Wu}Dawson scheme, but will be
less e!ective since the vector e (H~ )T is not necessarily of low (Hamming)
weight. Wu and Dawson state that this seems the most e$cient attack and
therefore conclude that the same level of security as that obtained in the
McEliece scheme can be achieved using smaller codes, which is an important
advantage in practical applications.
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De"ne the set of suitable secret keys (trapdoors)S
G,H~
for the Wu}Dawson
scheme as S
G,H~
:"MR3Fn]n
q
D GRT"0 and RH~"H~N. Each element of
this set can be used for decryption, since c!cRT"mG. Of course the key
H~H is inS, but of interest are the elements in this set that can be e$ciently
computed using only the public key, i.e., independent of knowing the (secret)
matrix H. The following theorem describes a subset of G
H~
which contains
the matrix H. This set depends on the public key MG, H~N only and not on the
particular choice of the parity check matrix for the code.
THEOREM 3.1. ‚et HI 3F(n~k)]n
q
be a parity check-matrix for the code C.
‚et r denote the rank of H~. If the set H is de,ned as H :"GHI H~ )HI "
M(HI H~)gHI 3F(n~k)]n
q
D (HI H~)g3GHI H~N, then
(i) H"GHH~ )H,
(ii) H3HL G
H~
and (iii) DH D"q(n~k)2/qr2 .
Proof. (i) To show that the set H does not depend on the choice of
the parity check matrix, note that HI "„H for some non-singular
„3F(n~k)](n~k)
q
. Use this and the de"nition of a generalized inverse to show
that GHI H~"GHH~ )„~1. This implies that
H"GHI H~ )HI "GHH~ )„~1„H"GHH~ )H,
i.e., H"M(HH~)gH3F(n~k)]n
q
D (HH~)g3GHH~N.
(ii) Let (HH~)gH3F(n~k)]n
q
be an element ofH. Multiplying the equality
HH~(HH~)gHH~"HH~
ron both sides from the left with H~ and using H~HH~"H~ yields
H~(HH~)gHH~"H~,
implying that (HH~)gH3G
H~
. The equality
HH~I
n~k
HH~"HH~HH~"HH~
yields I
n~k
3G
HH~
and consequently H3H.
(iii) From H~HH~"H~ it follows that rank(HH~)"rank(H~)"r.
Using Eq. (2.1) shows that DG
HH~
D"q(n~k)2~r2 . This is also the cardinality of
the set H, since H has a right-inverse. j
From this theorem we see that H"MHN i! r"n!k. In this case
HH~3F(n~k)](n~k)
q
is of rank n!k, i.e.,G
HH~
"M(HH~)~1N"MI
n~k
N, imply-
ing that HH~"I
n~k
. The (secret) matrix H can then be found by selecting an
390 PETER ROELSEarbitrary parity check matrix HI for the code C and computing HI H~.
Inverting this matrix (which is possible since HI H~"„HH~"„I
n~k
"„)
and multiplying this inverse from the right with HI yields H, so the secret key
H~H is revealed. If r(n!k (as suggested by Wu and Dawson) then the next
corollary shows that replacing H in the secret key by any element of the set
H still yields a trapdoor for the encryption function.
COROLLARY 3.2. De,ne T :"H~ )H"MH~(HI H~)gHI 3Fn]n
q
D (HI H~)g3
GHI H~N, then H~H3TLSG,H~ .
Proof. If H~(HI H~)gHI is an element of T, then
G(H~ (HI H~)gHI )T"GHI T(H~(HI H~)g)T"0. (3.1)
From Theorem 3.1(ii) it follows that H~H3H~ )H"T and
H~ )H )H~"MH~N. (3.2)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply that TLS
G,H~
. j
The following algorithm computes one of these trapdoors using O (n3) "eld
operations. The input of the algorithm is the public key MG, H~N. Without
loss of generality, assume that the matrix G is in standard form, i.e.,
G"(I
k
DA) for some A3Fk](n~k)
q
.
Algorithm 3.3.
1. Choose HI "(!AT D I
n~k
) and compute HI H~.
2. Use Gaussian elimination to transform HI H~ to row echelon form, i.e.,
"nd a non-singular matrix S3F(n~k)](n~k)
q
such that SHI H~"; with
;3F(n~k)](n~k)
q
a row echelon matrix. S represents the row operations
on HI H~ needed for this transformation.
3. Find a permutation matrix P3F(n~k)](n~k)
q
such that
;P"A
A
11
O
A
12
O B
with A
11
3Fr]r
q
a non-singular matrix, i.e., the "rst r columns of ;P are
the pivot columns of ;.
4. Return
H~P A
A~1
11
O
O
OB SHI .
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algorithm is an element of the set T, note that
A
A
11
O
A
12
O B A
A~1
11
O
O
OB A
A
11
O
A
12
O B"A
A
11
O
A
12
O B ,
which implies
A
A~1
11
O
O
OB3GSHI H~P .
The correctness of Algorithm 3.3 now follows from GHI H~"PGSHI H~PS, since
S and P are invertible matrices. j
Remark 3.4. Consider the following slightly modi"ed version of Algo-
rithm 3.3. In Step 2, "nd two non-singular matrices S
1
, S
2
3F(n~k)](n~k)
q
such
that
S
1
HI H~S
2
"A
I
r
O
O
OB .
This can be done with Gaussian elimination: S
1
and S
2
represent the row and
column operations respectively. The set of generalized inverses of S
1
HI H~S
2
is given by
G
S1HI H~S2
"GA
I
r
B
21
B
12
B
22
B3F(n~k)](n~k)q H ,
with B
12
3Fr](n~k~r)
q
, B
21
3F(n~k~r)]r
q
, and B
22
3F(n~k~r)](n~k~r)
q
arbitrary
matrices. Select one element (S
1
HI H~S
2
)g3G
S1HI H~S2
and return the matrix
H~S
2
(S
1
HI H~S
2
)gS
1
HI . The correctness of this version follows from
GHI H~"S2GS1HI H~S2S1 . Note that with this version any element of the set
T can be computed with O(n3) "eld operations. However, if only one
trapdoor is needed, Algorithm 3.3 is preferable, since it is more e$cient in
practice.
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